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SOME AFTER DINNER THOUGHTS ON THEORY OF MIND 
RITA ASTUTI 
 
[Editor's note: This is, literally, the transcript of an after dinner talk given by Rita Astuti on the 
occasion of a conference held at Stanford University in September 2011. The conference, 
organised by Tanya Luhrmann, was entitled "Towards an anthropological Theory of 
Mind".  For readers unfamiliar with the relevant debates in psychology and philosophy, it will 
help to know - at least roughly - what “Theory of Mind” refers to. To put it simply: “Theory of 
Mind” is the human ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to other people (this is 
one reason it has been called a theory: because it is about phenomena that are not directly 
observable). We use Theory of Mind to attribute knowledge and ignorance, emotions and 
thoughts, intentions and desire to others, and to predict and explain their behaviour (this is 
the second reason it has been called a theory: because it is used to make predictions). The 
awareness that other people may have false beliefs about the world has been regarded as 
the ultimate proof that one has Theory of Mind. Whether this awareness is something we are 
born with or something that emerges in the course of cognitive development is a hotly 
debated issue. In the literature, Theory of Mind is often abbreviated as ToM.] 
 
The only other time I’ve been at a conference with a scheduled after dinner talk was a few 
years ago at Trinity College, Cambridge. The conference was on belief, and it had been 
funded by the Perrott-Warrick Fund, a Fund set up in the 1930s to scientifically prove the 
existence of the paranormal and the afterlife. 
Although this unusual source of funding did not appear to affect the proceedings during the 
day, by the time darkness fell magic was allowed to take over. At dinner, we were treated to 
a magic show, delivered by a professional magician who was also a professionally trained 
psychologist. He first enchanted us with his tricks, and then revealed the psychological 
principles underlying them – basically, he made us aware of how he had manipulated our 
minds to make the magic work. 
 
  
For example, he performed a simple – and yet so seductive – disappearing trick, and we all 
fell for it. Then he explained that, apart from the undeniable dexterity of his fingers, the 
magic worked because of our – the audience’s – mind reading abilities. 
He counted on the fact that if he intently looked OVER HERE, at his left hand, the audience 
would FOLLOW HIS GAZE and concentrate on what he was looking at. And while we were 
focusing on his left hand, the real trick was happening OVER THERE, in his right hand – but 
nobody noticed. 
Of course, the reason I’m telling you this story – which I chose to do before realizing that 
Graham Jones was going to be here[1] – is that gaze following is one of the basic 
components of our mind reading abilities: a building block of Theory of Mind, the topic 
of this conference. 
 
You follow my gaze because you want to know what I’m seeing (you know that looking is 
seeing) and what state of knowledge or ignorance I’m in (you know that seeing is knowing). 
By following each other’s gaze, we can coordinate our focus of attention (we can both see 
and know the same thing) and monitor whether we are paying attention to each other – for 
example, monitoring where you are looking at is a pretty good way of finding out whether 
you are following what I’m saying or whether you are bored or distracted; although of course, 
like the magician, you can easily deceive me by pretending to focus your attention on me 
while thinking about something else… 
In saying all of this, I might be taking a big gamble – I’m assuming that you have a mind! 
This assumption, and what follows from it – that you have knowledge, desires, intentions, 
emotions, beliefs and that it is your knowledge, desires, intentions, emotions and beliefs that 
explain your actions or lack thereof – is what Theory of Mind is all about. 
In essence, having a Theory of Mind amounts to having a non-behaviourist way of looking at 
the world. 
When you see someone running, you don’t just see a physical body in acceleration – you 
see the intention or the desire to catch the bus or win a medal; when you see a hand 
reaching for an object, you don’t just see a trajectory through space – you see the goal of 
getting that object; and so on. 
Having a Theory of Mind, in other words, means having the capacity to go beyond the 
surface, beyond the behaviour and the actions to the intentions, the desires, the beliefs that 
motivate them. From this “deeper” perspective, the world is not just made up of arms, legs 
and eyes that move in a coordinated fashion; the world is also made up of a host of mental 
states – your own and those of others – that direct and animate what those arms, legs and 
eyes do. 
Now, as I understand it, the broad aim of this conference is to find ways of establishing 
whether there is any foundation to what Tanya Luhrmann has referred to as the 
“anthropological suspicion” that there are significant cross-cultural variations in ToM. 
Before we set out to work on this task, bringing together our expertise as anthropologists, 
linguists, and psychologists, I want to explore what I take to be two very crucial evidential 
questions. 
The first one is: what can count as evidence that others have Theory of Mind – that they 
understand other people in terms of their mental states? 
And the second one is: what can count as evidence that there are cross-cultural variations in 
Theory of Mind? 
The two questions are obviously linked, but let me take them in turn. 
The first question raises at least two tricky evidential problems: 
One is that agents can behave as if they have a ToM, while in fact all they need is an 
understanding of the regularity of certain patterned behaviours. For example, the fact that I 
can predict that someone who is stretching her arm towards an object has the goal of 
retrieving it, can be explained by the fact that I have seen many times that people who 
stretch their arms towards an object, complete their action by grasping and retrieving that 
object; I can predict what the person will do next and I might even help them complete the 
sequence, without imputing any goals at all. 
 
This has been, and continues to be, a thorny issue in the quest to determine whether 
chimpanzees have a ToM – as in the famous 1987 Premack and Woodruff paper which 
launched the research on ToM. 
Those who are sceptical, most notably Povinelli and his colleagues (Povinelli & Vonk 2003; 
Povinelli 2004), argue that all the attempts that have been made to show that chimpanzees 
attribute mental states to others – either humans or conspecifics – can be interpreted more 
parsimoniously in terms of their sophisticated understanding of the rules that govern 
behaviour. On this view, chimps are smart but are not mentalizers (and indeed, Povinelli 
accuses those who say that chimpanzees have a ToM of anthropocentricism – we are so 
dependent on our ToM to understand action and behaviour that we can’t help but see it in 
the actions of creatures that don’t have it). 
At the methodological level, this scepticism explains why experiments that aim to establish 
the existence of ToM, whether in human infants or chimpanzees, try to come up with entirely 
novel situations whose solution could not have been predicted from experience, but which 
depend on novel inferences that can only be made on the basis of the attribution of mental 
states. 
The second methodological problem in assessing the existence of ToM competence has to 
do with whether the various diagnostic tasks designed to reveal it really require the reading 
of the mind of the other.  As pointed out when Premack and Woodruff claimed that their 
chimp Sarah had a ToM because she seemed able to predict what a human actor would do 
next in order to achieve his goal, all that Sarah needed in order to succeed was 1) to be very 
smart, which she clearly was, and 2) to imagine what she would do if she were in that 
sequence of events. Again, she could have solved the task without ever imputing a goal to 
the mind of another actor. 
 
This problem, of course, is at the origin of the false belief task (Dennett 1987; Winner & 
Perner 1983), which has come to dominate the research in ToM. As you all know, the task is 
designed to find out whether a child is able to predict the behaviour of another person based 
on what that other person believes, which happens to be different from what the child 
believes and knows to be the case. Thus, to succeed in this task, you truly have to enter the 
mind of the other and understand that other people can have mental states different from 
your own and that they can have false beliefs, i.e. that they can fail to see how the world 
really is. The point of the task is that it requires what Paul Harris (n.d.) calls a “self-
abnegating prediction.” 
I’m sure that in the next couple of days we will have many opportunities to come back to the 
false belief task and to the exciting new findings that have emerged in the past few years in 
relation to it (e.g., Baillargeon et al. 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Southgate et al. 2007; 
Surian et al. 2007) but for the moment all I want to stress is the great care taken by those 
that attribute ToM to children or chimpanzees – the evidential tests are extremely stringent, 
as researchers are well aware that it is far too easy to over-interpret the evidence and over-
attribute mind-reading abilities to others. 
What then of the evidence used to assess whether there are cross-cultural variations in 
ToM? 
Angeline Lillard, herself a developmental psychologist, has argued that there are significant 
variations by making extensive use of the anthropological literature on the way people talk 
about minds, persons, emotions, and so on (Lillard 1998). Here’s one notable response she 
got from Scholl and Leslie – supporters of the view that ToM is grounded in a cognitive 
module that develops along universal lines: 
The cross-cultural differences catalogued by Lillard explicitly include differences in religious 
beliefs, and beliefs in phenomena such as witchcraft, magic and karma. As such, her view of 
cross-cultural ToM differences pertains only to the inessential fluorescence of mature ToM 
competence, rather than to its essential character in early acquisition… in general, Lillard 
seems to be looking at differences in specific beliefs, rather than at the concept of belief… 
even specific beliefs about the concept of belief are not necessarily relevant: the concept of 
belief could be universally grounded in a module [as Scholl & Leslie argue] even though 
most cultures do not recognize the “modular” account in their own folk psychology! (Scholl & 
Leslie 1999: 137) 
 
Think of the following analogy. People might have all sorts of different theories about the 
way their vision works – e.g. they might have an emission theory of vision, as apparently 
50% of US college students have. But whatever theory they have, it is unlikely to make a 
difference to the way their retina works, to what they see and what they don’t. By analogy, 
this is what School and Leslie argue is the case with Theory of Mind: whatever explicit folk 
theory about the mind people have, it is going to make no difference to their mind-reading 
abilities. 
I hasten to say that I don’t find this position entirely plausible, at least in its extreme form, but 
I think that it is useful to keep Scholl and Leslie’s criticism in mind when working towards the 
aim of this conference. Like those who work with young infants and chimpanzees, we need 
to be very careful in considering (and hopefully agreeing) on the kind of evidence that would 
count as evidence for the fact that, to paraphrase Tanya Luhrmann once again, cross-
cultural variations in the ways people imagine the mind have consequences for mental 
experience. 
 
To use one of Lillard’s examples, does the fact that people explain the behaviours of others 
by invoking witchcraft or astrology count as evidence that they have a different Theory of 
Mind? Or does the fact that people have a concept of mind that diminishes what happens 
inside individual minds and emphasizes instead what happens between minds count as 
evidence that they have a different Theory of Mind? 
To begin to approach these kinds of questions, we might need to start by acknowledging 
that, in fact, Lillard, on the one hand, and Scholl and Leslie on the other, are really talking 
about different things, or rather, about different levels of the same thing – one is the level of 
conscious reflection about the mind, what we might call Explicit Theories of Theory of Mind, 
and the other is the level of mindreading that happens largely outside conscious reflection 
and probably conscious control. Ethnographic methods are of course well suited to record 
the former, while experimental methods are best suited to tap into the latter. 
Questions about the way these two levels may be linked to each other (and it seems, prima 
facie, sensible to expect that they must be linked somehow) and questions about how they 
might influence each other (again, it seems sensible to expect that they must do somehow) 
can only be asked if we recognize that what people say about the mind, as a result of 
personal and culturally mediated reflection, is not the same kind of phenomenon as what 
people do when, largely automatically and unconsciously, they follow somebody’s gaze, they 
infer intentions or beliefs to predict what some one will do next, and so on. 
To illustrate this point, let me tell you about an experiment, which is part of a series of 
studies, designed at the Department of Cognitive Science at the Central European University 
in Budapest, which have come to be known as the SMURF studies (Kovács et al. 2010) 
The experiment asks participants, recruited in Trieste, Italy, to watch one of four different 
versions of a movie which involves a ball that first rolls behind a screen and then either stays 
there or rolls away out of sight. Participants are told that at the end of the movie, the screen 
will be removed and that if they see the ball after this happens, they have to press a button 
as fast as they can. 
This sounds like a daft reaction task, were it not for the surreptitious role played by a Smurf, 
in all its blue glory! The Smurf is just a bystander who comes on the scene at the start of 
each movie. From where it stands, on the side of the screen, the Smurf has the same visual 
access to the ball as the participants who are watching and reacting to the film. Except that, 
in all four versions of the movie, but at different moments in the sequence of events, the 
Smurf leaves and then re-enters the scene. 
Now, the point of the experiment is to manipulate the expectation that you – the participant – 
have formed about the location of the ball and the expectation of the Smurf who, because of 
its exits from the scene, does not always share the same expectation as you. 
Thus, when the screen is removed and, in half of the trials, the ball is there to be detected – 
only these are test trials, since reaction times can only be measured when the ball is behind 
the screen – you and the Smurf can both be “right” in your expectation that the ball is behind 
the screen, or you can both be “wrong” (neither of you expecting the ball to be there), or one 
of you can be “right” and the other one “wrong” (where “right” and “wrong” are measured 
against the test trials’ actual outcome). 
So, this is how it works: 
FILM 1 
The Smurf enters 
The ball rolls behind the screen 
The Smurf leaves – nothing happens 
The Smurf returns 
In this case, both you and the Smurf rightly expect that the ball is behind the screen; 
FILM 2 
The Smurf enters 
The ball rolls behind the screen 
The ball rolls away 
The Smurf leaves – nothing happens 
The Smurf returns 
In this case, both you and the Smurf wrongly expect that the ball is not behind the screen; 
FILM 3 
The Smurf enters 
The ball rolls behind the screen 
The Smurf leaves – balls rolls away 
The Smurf returns 
In this case, the Smurf rightly expects that the ball is behind the screen, while you wrongly 
expect that it is not; 
FILM 4 
The Smurf enters 
The ball rolls behind the screen 
The ball rolls away 
The Smurf leaves – balls returns 
The Smurf returns 
In this case, you rightly expect that the ball is behind the screen, while the Smurf wrongly 
expects that it is not. 
Because of these manipulations, the question that this cleverly designed study allows us to 
ask is whether the expectation of the Smurf makes any difference to the reaction time of the 
participants. 
Note that the participants were never told anything about the Smurf, they were not instructed 
to pay attention to its presence, its movements or its expectations about the presence of the 
ball, and indeed the Smurf’s expectations are totally irrelevant to the participants’ perceptual 
task of detecting the presence of the tennis ball. 
And yet, what the reaction times show is that, irrelevant as it may be, participants 
automatically and unconsciously represented to themselves and were affected by where the 
Smurf expected the ball to be. 
Compared to the baseline reaction time – when both the participants and the Smurf had the 
same incorrect expectation that the ball was not behind the screen and were thus at their 
slowest in detecting the ball  – the results indicate that: 
 
• Unsurprisingly, participants were faster than in the baseline when both they and the 
Smurf correctly expected the ball to be behind the screen; 
 
• That, reassuringly, participants were faster than in the baseline when they correctly 
expected the ball to be behind the screen and the Smurf didn’t – the Smurf’s 
incorrect expectation did not affect them; 
 
• And that, somewhat astonishingly, participants were faster whenthey did not expect 
the ball to be behind the screen but the Smurf did! 
In other words, participants computed the Smurf’s expectation – that the ball is behind the 
screen – and this influenced their behaviour even though it was inconsistent with their own 
expectation that the ball was not there. Indeed, their reaction times were not significantly 
different in the two conditions when the expectation that the ball was behind the screen was 
their own or that of the Smurf.[2] 
 
To me, this study provides a perfect illustration of the kind of automatic, unconscious, low-
level processes that make up our mind-reading abilities. Here we have participants whose 
very simple task is to press a button when they detect a ball, and what we find is that even 
when performing such a simple task, they cannot help entering somebody else’s mind and 
becoming entangled in what somebody else knows and expects about the world. 
Now, let me put this Smurf study side by side with the fascinating accounts by Joel Robbins, 
Bambi Schieffelin and the other contributors to the special issue of Anthropological 
Quarterly on Mind Opacity in the Pacific Region (Rumsey & Robbins 2008). They report that 
their informants insist that they cannot know what is inside other people’s minds, and recoil 
at the idea that one might dare read other people’s intentions. 
Is such a “doctrine” – as Robbins refers to it – just inessential fluorescenceas Scholl and 
Leslie would have it? 
 
Well, I don’t think that we actually know the answer to this kind of question yet, but the way 
forward, in my view, would be to take something like the Smurf study to people who insist 
that they cannot know the content of the minds of others – and who teach their children not 
to discuss other people’s intentions and not to interpret their behaviours with reference to 
their elusive and unknowable mental states – in order to see whether their doctrine and the 
social practices that are shaped by it make a difference to their reaction times. 
I’m prepared to believe that they might, although my uneducated guess – not having done 
fieldwork with people who subscribe to this doctrine – is that probably, at this level of fast, 
automatic, unconscious interpenetration of minds, we would find no difference. 
If this were to be the case, we might proceed by using the same sort of task, but by first 
priming participants to think about their opacity doctrine and see whether this makes a 
difference, such that their doctrine, when explicitly activated, interferes with the computation 
of the content of somebody else’s mind. One could, for example, manipulate the identity of 
the bystander, making it into a more or less powerful figure, or changing its religious 
affiliation; or perhaps one could get people to experience a typical situation in which they are 
reminded of their “opacity” doctrine before they take the task. 
And if this doesn’t work, one might design a number of tasks that make mind reading 
gradually more explicit to see at what point – and at what age – people refuse to enter the 
mind of another agent. 
Consider that back in Trieste, using a simplified version of the study, the Smurf mind-reading 
effect was found among 7 month old infants.[3] We might thus predict that younger children in 
the Pacific region might similarly be inclined to automatically compute other people’s beliefs 
and expectations – just like infants in Trieste – but that, as they grow older, they might 
gradually learn to abide by the (culturally specific) “opacity of mind” doctrine, at least in some 
contexts. 
 
These are just a few examples of what I see as the task ahead. 
The fundamental task is to explore in great detail, through stringent evidential procedures 
that take time and a great deal of care, the points of articulation between people’s explicit 
theories about the mind and the mental processes that, largely automatically and 
unconsciously, take them beyond the surface, well inside the minds of others, and, who 
knows, might make them all susceptible to the magician’s tricks. 
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1. In his book Trade of the tricks (2011), Graham Jones discusses the crucial role of what he 
calls a “working theory of mind” in the practice of magicians in contemporary France. ↩ 
 
2. And the effect did not go away even when, in a follow up study, the Smurf did not reappear 
on the scene to witness the lowering of the screen, suggesting that the representation of the 
Smurf’s expectation endures in the mind of the participants, even in the Smurf’s absence. By 
contrast, the effect goes away when participants witnessed the exact same ball movements, 
but in the presence of a stack of blocks, instead of a Smurf. ↩ 
 
 
3. The study measured the infants’ surprise (as measured by their looking times) at the fact 
that the ball was not behind the screen when they expected it to be there. As with adults, 
infants also computed the expectation of the Smurf, looking longer when they themselves 
did not expect the ball to be behind the screen but the Smurf did. ↩ 
 
